INTRODUCTION
Corporations are undergoing a subtle transformation. Usually regarded as investment vehicles for shareholders, 1 corporations are now assuming an additional identity-as entities which share responsibility for upholding human rights. 2 This new identity does not sit comfortably with conventional wisdom on corporate governance. Traditional corporate governance theory, based on nineteenth century notions of trust, posits that 'the company' is a legal entity embodying the members from time to time. 3 Directors, as trustees of corporate assets, owe duties to foster the interests of the shareholders by maximising their investments. 4 Under this view, directors do not owe wider obligations to society.
This traditional understanding, however, is beginning to yield to more recent legal and social pressures. Legal developments in regulatory practice, in combination with an upsurge in social movement activism, is now forcing corporations to accept that they are more than mere economic entities. 5 Neo-institutionalism in economics also sees the corporation as more than an economic entity. For an economic theory of the corporation that also sees the corporation as a
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND HUMAN RIGHTS: RECENT TRENDS IN AUSTRALIA AND JAPAN
In the 1990s, two trends are encouraging directors and top managers to see, at least tentatively, that corporate social responsibilities are part of their corporate governance obligations: (1) formal legal techniques for making senior managers and directors accountable for failures; and (2) public scrutiny and social movement activism.
Legal techniques
The legal path to incorporating social responsibilities into the duties of corporate management relies on two legal techniques. The first is a generally increased emphasis on broader corporate governance responsibilities. In the AWA case, the Supreme Court of New South Wales found that both the CEO and non-executive directors of a company could be found negligent for failing to ensure adequate internal controls were put in place to protect against losses due to foreign exchange dealings. 19 The case made it very clear that directors are individually responsible, not just for setting broad policy, but also for taking an active interest in ensuring adequate corporate governance systems to bring the company into compliance with policy. In theory, at least, this decision leaves the way open for directors to be held personally responsible for corporate failures that result in breaches of a variety of laws and regulations (including those that explicitly or implicitly protect human rights such as health and safety regulation and anti-discrimination regulation). 20 Certainly, the anecdotal evidence is strong that many directors and senior managers are now very concerned to ensure they have more detailed internal control and compliance systems in place to make sure they are meeting the requirements of not only the Australian Corporations Law but also the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) and other regulations.
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There is some quantitative empirical evidence to support this. For example, see J Sanders, V L Hamilton and T Yuasa, "The Institutionalization of Sanctions for Wrongdoing Inside Organizations: Public Judgments in Japan, Russia and the United States" (1998) 32(4) L & Soc'y Rev 871, who find that Tokyo-based respondents to a survey about appropriate sanctions for organizational wrongdoing more often suggested restorative sanctions should be applied to the organization (eg, an apology) than did Russian and US respondents.
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Daniels & Ors v AWA (1995) 13 ACLC 614. AWA decided to hedge against foreign currency fluctuations by forward purchases of foreign currency against contracts for imported goods. The company lost over $49 million, although the accounts appeared to show they had made a substantial profit. The company's management had relied on one person to control the dealing, and on the external auditors to check what went on. The management failed to set up an adequate system of internal control and record keeping, and did not act upon the failures in internal controls that were brought to its attention by the auditors.
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This is a line of reasoning that the Delaware Court of Chancery has taken in the influential case of In Re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698 A 2d 959 (1996) . See J Hill, "Deconstructing Sunbeam-Contemporary Issues in Corporate Governance" (1999) 17 C&SLJ 288.
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In Japan, the legal mechanism for broadening directors' duties lies in Article 266-3 21 of the Commercial Code. 22 This article provides that directors are personally liable to third parties for losses sustained as a result of intentional or grossly negligent dereliction of duties. In the 1969 case of Mutō v Izuo Kōkai KK, 23 the Supreme Court held that article 266-3 was a special provision designed to protect third parties (especially creditors) and that it operated in addition to, not in combination, with any civil law tort requirements. 24 Third parties could seek compensation under article 266-3 for their losses, whether directly or indirectly caused. In seeking damages, third parties need only prove that the directors exercised bad faith or gross negligence when performing their duties to the company; it is unnecessary to establish any further illegality in the more immediate relationship between the third party and the director. The voluminous 25 case law on article 255-3 has focused on balancing directors' responsibilities to protect third parties with their broader discretion to take business risks. 26 However, at least in theory, the courts would not allow a discretion to act if a business decision amounted to a violation of a law or the Articles of Incorporation. 27 In such a case, an injured third party could invoke article 266-3 to seek compensation directly from the directors. This possibility throws open personal liability for directors of Japanese companies if a breach of a law or regulation-including those relating to anti-discrimination, environmental management and product safety-results in losses. Following the collapse of the bubble economy in the early 1990s and the banking crisis in the mid to late 1990s, 28 many corporations are becoming increasingly sensitive to such a risk. 29 As a result, since about 1998, a number of Japanese corporations and financial institutions have begun establishing internal compliance policies and systems to meet their responsibilities under the Civil Code, Commercial Code, banking and finance laws, environmental statutes and labour legislation. 30 The second legal technique by which directors and managers are being held accountable for social responsibilities is via strict vicarious liability for regulatory offences coupled with the availability of 'due diligence' defences or damages discounts _____________________________________________________________________________________ 21 See generally R W Dziubla, "Enforcing Corporate Responsibility: Japanese Corporate Directors' Liability to Third Parties for Failure to Supervise" (1986) 18 Law in Japan 55. Ibid.
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Volume 28 ____________________________________________________________________________________ for having in place a system to prevent breaches. 31 Due diligence defences allow directors and top management to escape personal liability for a regulatory offence committed by an agent of the corporation if they can show they had in place an effective internal control or compliance system to prevent the breach occurring.
'Due diligence' type defences abound in Australian law. For example, many pieces of environmental legislation deem directors and managers directly liable for high financial penalties or even prison sentences if the company is found guilty of environmental offences, unless they can prove that a defence such as due diligence applies. 32 Similarly, in trade practices regulation, the courts will discount the damages payable by the company and top managers where an effective compliance system is in place. The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission regularly negotiates settlements and/or damages on this basis. 33 In anti-discrimination regulation, top managers cannot be made personally liable unless they were personally involved in the incident. However, the company can be made vicariously liable, in which case they may invoke due diligence defences either in formal court proceedings or in informal negotiations with anti-discrimination regulators. 34 In Japan, by contrast, the concept of 'due diligence' has yet to be entrenched in legislation, but its potential is currently of great interest to legal scholars. For example, some scholars forecast that Japanese corporate governance law will soon move in the direction taken by United States law 35 and embrace 'due diligence' as the tool for testing directors' liability for regulatory breaches. 36 Others predict developments in Japanese vicarious liability law. 37 In form, this law provides corporations immunity from liability for the transgressions of employees if they take sufficient care assigning and supervising employees; in practice, however, no Japanese court in the postwar era has ever granted this exemption. 38 
Social activism
The second path by which social responsibilities are entering the internal management of companies is via scrutiny of corporate activities by media outlets and activist groups. Public disclosure of corporate scandals has been especially important in driving this development. In recent years, the public's attention has been drawn to scandals on a range of issues: from ethical investments and payments, health and safety, financial responsibility and the environment; to workers' rights, discrimination, relations with indigenous communities, and entanglement with corrupt political regimes. 40 Negative publicity has made top managements of targeted companies see social responsibility as a priority for practical reasons of public relations and brand image, even if liability is not technically a legal issue.
Corporate Japan has been especially susceptible to this trend. 41 In the post-bubble recession which has gripped the Japanese economy for most of the 1990s, a series of corporate failures and banking scandals have severely tarnished the image of many Japanese businesses, both domestically and internationally. The financial sector's inability to contain bad debt, culminating in the collapse in November 1997 of Japan's tenth largest bank, Hokkaido Takushoku Bank, and fourth largest broking firm, Yamaichi Securities Corporation, led to a widespread loss of confidence in the Japanese financial system. 42 Multi-billion dollar bailouts of financial institutions, such as Cosmo and Kizu Credit Unions and Hyōgo Bank, and a string of insolvencies involving major corporations fuelled further public outcry. 43 Reports of corporate excesses quickly filled the pages of newspapers: corporations expending lavish sums 'entertaining' public officials; securities brokers unlawfully covering the financial losses of their clients; company directors paying the mafia (sokaiya) to control annual general meetings of shareholders. 44 With Japan still struggling to escape its longest recession since the war, corporations are looking to embrace 'compliance' programs 45 to restore the public's faith in their businesses. 46 Outside of Japan, chemical companies and mining companies often bear the brunt of negative media attention. There is some early evidence of Japanese corporations successfully restoring their corporate image by implementing compliance management plans. Toshiba Corporation, for example, implemented a compliance system to monitor its exports after it was exposed illegally exporting nuclear-capable technology to the (then) USSR contrary to export restrictions set by COCOM (the Coordinating Committee for Export Control): ibid at 44. 
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Volume 28 ____________________________________________________________________________________ and the North Sea, Esso (Exxon) at Longford. But a number of companies are also coming under scrutiny on human rights issues, most notably clothing companies such as Nike, Levis and Disney for using local sweatshop labor or overseas under-age and under-paid labour. The result of this trend is that, globally, a number of very large companies are joining voluntary initiatives or hiring consultants with the aim of pursuing or appearing to pursue a 'triple bottom line'-financial sustainability, social sustainability and environmental sustainability. For example, the World Business Council for Sustainable Development which explicitly embraces the 'triple bottom line' approach includes members such as Australian mining companies BHP and WMC and international giants Dow, DuPont, General Motors, Procter & Gamble, Johnson & Johnson and Monsanto. After its experience of public outcry and brand value diminution over its proposed disposal of the Brent Spar in the North Sea, Shell withdrew from the Global Climate Coalition (a United States-based industry body dedicated to campaigning against regulatory measures to limit greenhouse gas emissions) and hired the consultants SustainAbility to help them consult with stakeholders and build a triple bottom line approach. In Australia companies like BHP and WMC are competing with each other to produce fuller and better 'triple bottom line'-type environmental reports that detail environmental and social responsibility management activities over a variety of areas.
'SETTING UP' A MODEL FOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS: SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND THE AUSTRALIAN CORPORATION Sexual Harassment and Corporate Compliance in Australia
In corporate Australia, compliance with sexual harassment law seems to be firmly on management's agenda. The evidence points to larger Australian companies devoting management attention to preventing sexual harassment, resolving grievances and disciplining wrongdoers. According to the anecdotal evidence of private lawyers and regulators, companies are regularly hiring lawyers and consultants to help implement sexual harassment policies and conduct inhouse training sessions. While in earlier cases, recipients of unwanted sexual attention and harassment were often forced to resign, now the person found by an internal corporate discipline system to have perpetrated an act of sexual harassment is likely to be dismissed. 47 Sexual Harassment and the Corporation 517 ____________________________________________________________________________________ they now prefer to deal with incidents of harassment internally or to settle with a payout if the internal grievance system is exhausted. 48 Over the last five or six years, both HREOC and state discrimination agencies, such as the New South Wales Anti-Discrimination Board (ADB), have received numerous requests for assistance from companies wishing to set up anti-discrimination policies. A majority of the requests concern sexual harassment policies in particular. 49 In response to the demand, HREOC has published a general sexual harassment code of practice; it has also prepared a specific guide for educational institutions. 50 The ADB has published guidelines and sample sexual harassment policies, grievance handling procedures and staff surveys to help employers prevent harassment and handle complaints. The ADB also offers consultancy and training services for organisations on sexual harassment and other aspects of anti-discrimination. 51 Demand is high enough among Australian corporations to sustain a variety of other publications aimed at helping corporate legal and equal opportunity advisers set up sexual harassment policies. 52 Some systematic quantitative evidence shows that Australian corporate managements are seriously addressing sexual harassment-and that they are doing better in this area than in other areas of gender discrimination. An Affirmative Action Agency (AAA) analysis of corporate equal employment opportunity performance found that 70 per cent of all organisations reporting to the AAA already had sexual harassment complaints resolution procedures in place by 1994, and that this had increased to over 85 per cent by 1996. 53 These companies' sexual harassment policies were not merely confined to formal, document-based disciplinary and grievance handling procedures. Between 1994 and 1996, there was a 25 per cent increase among organisations in male-dominated and gender-mixed industries self-reporting that they proactively sought to prevent sexual harassment by providing training to management and staff. 
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Volume 28 ____________________________________________________________________________________ sexual harassment, and 70 per cent provided training to management aimed at preventing harassment and learning to handle grievances. 54 A HREOC-sponsored study of gender discrimination in the finance industry (one of the major employers of women in Australia) provides further evidence that although gender discrimination is still rife in that industry, corporate managements have shown some sustained commitment to eliminating sexual harassment. 55 The affirmative action reports of the top 75 Australian financial institutions showed that their performance on personnel policies relating to conditions of service was strongest in relation to sexual harassment. Eighty-seven percent self-reported that management actively promoted a work environment free of harassment and 81 per cent reported that formal procedures were in place to deal with complaints of sexual harassment in their firms. These results were two of the three strongest recorded out of 19 performance areas of affirmative action in conditions of service. 56 The study also showed that paper policies have translated into some real change in corporate culture as judged by women employees. 57 An attitudinal questionnaire found that only 26 per cent of women employees in three major banks thought that "sexual harassment occurs at pre-executive and executive level" in their firm, while 71 per cent agreed that "managers promote an harassment free workplace". This compared with much higher perceptions of more general sex discrimination problems: 58 per cent of women believed that "affirmative action is needed in this company, because there is still some discrimination against women"; and 41 per cent of women thought that sexual discrimination occurred at pre-executive and executive level in their firms. 58 While HREOC's finance industry study found that women's career opportunities were still limited by "glass ceilings and sticky floors", 59 the relatively positive findings on sexual harassment show there is some movement by corporate management towards adopting anti-discrimination norms in at least this one area. We would not like to conclude from this evidence that all large Australian companies have excellent sexual harassment prevention and remedial systems. In fact, we are sure that all companies need to improve and that most companies outside of the services industries (such as manufacturing and mining) probably still have a long way to go. But neither should we ignore the voice of those women employees in the finance industry who believe their companies have already greatly improved in this area. In the following section of this article, we suspend disbelief for long enough to examine the conditions that have lead to these modest successes and try to determine whether we can draw any conclusions about whether or notand, if so, whencorporate governance of Ibid.
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Sexual Harassment and the Corporation 519 ____________________________________________________________________________________ human rights more generally might be possible. We will then use the experience of sexual harassment in Japan to examine possible pitfalls and dangers of a 'corporate governance' approach to human rights.
Towards successful corporate governance of sexual harassment
No company will spontaneously develop an effective internal governance system for sexual harassment (or, indeed, any other human right). Rather it will only do so in response to both external and internal pressures. To ensure a high quality governance system, external ideas and values about human rights-not just internal business concerns-must influence corporate management. Therefore, any model for the corporate governance of sexual harassment must explain how external values enshrined in human rights can interact with and impact on day-to-day internal corporate management. In other words, it must be a model for how the social movement politics of human rights can permeate the corporate managerial politics of profit and infiltrate human resources decision-making. It must also account for how conciliatory or disciplinary internal grievance handling systems can articulate with legal rights in formal courts and anti-discrimination tribunals.
The orthodox means that governments have used to make corporations socially responsible over the last century is 'command and control' regulationregulation in which standards, backed by criminal sanctions, are imposed on companies. 60 Since the early 1980s, scholars and policy analysts have criticised command and control regulation from two main perspectives: (1) an economic analysis that sees the costs of assessing, understanding and complying with command and control regulation as unacceptably high; and (2) a socio-political analysis of the ineffectiveness of much command and control regulation to produce compliance with regulatory objectives. The experience of command and control shows that it is neither reasonable, practical nor effective for external legislatures and regulators to be solely responsible for determining how organisations should manage social issues. 61 The design and enforcement of regulation to govern every potential social dilemma facing business is simply not achievable. And even if it were achievable, it would not make businesses better citizens, since citizenship implies an internal capacity to respond with integrity to external values. 62 John Braithwaite's policy-oriented criminology offers a springboard from which to develop an alternative model. As the leading empirical and theoretical account of corporate accountability, his body of work analyses how scrutiny by regulators and public interest groups-combined with the background threat of 'big stick' legal sanctions and negative publicity-can maximise the potential for corporate selfregulation. 63 
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Volume 28 ____________________________________________________________________________________ suggests that, in general, it is better to maximise the possibility for regulatees to comply with regulatory objectives voluntarily rather than to constantly rely on heavy sanctions or coercive regulatory regimes. They find empirically that when regulators use strategies of "dialogue, communal judgment, reciprocal wooing, and persuasion, which is minimally coerced by power relations", they can negotiate more constructive regulatory outcomes. 64 By contrast, when regulators use coercive strategies, they often break down the goodwill and motivation of actors who might otherwise have been responsive. However, they also find that persuasive and self-regulatory regulation is more likely to be effective when backed up by the possibility of more severe sanctions: regulatees, then, will know there is a certainty of punishment if they defect and that other regulatees will not get away with breaking the rules. Based on the same empirical and normative conclusions, Fisse and Braithwaite propose targeting punishment to mobilise those who can change corporate cultures to do so, and then giving self-regulation a chance. 65 Ayres and Braithwaite argue that regulators should start with persuasive or restorative strategies and then move to more punitive strategies if voluntary compliance fails. Thus, if the regulator succeeds in bringing about compliance by applying punitive sanctions, then it can respond by reverting to a trusting demeanour rather than building resistance by being overly punitive. If the initial round of punitive sanctions does not bring about compliance, then the regulator can respond by invoking harsher sanctions. The wider the range of strategies (from dialogic to punitive) available to the regulator, the more successful this type of responsive, 'tit for tat' enforcement is likely to be. Prioritising self-regulation ensures more frequent use of cooperative measures, without compromising the accountability provided by using more punitive measures where necessary.
How may we apply this theory to corporate governance of sexual harassment? The Ayres and Braithwaite theory suggests that the policy goal is that companies should be primarily responsible for educating employees and seeking to change attitudes to resolve problems of harassment that do occur and to prevent harassment occurring in the future. But Ayres and Braithwaite also suggest that private adjudication of public rights can only be effective if public anti-discrimination agencies, courts and public interest groups have the power and capacity to hold corporate governments responsible to anti-discrimination standards when corporate compliance fails, as it inevitably will. Corporate liability for harassment and social movement activism must propel internal corporate justice systems to address harassment and to do it according to appropriate standards. Connecting public anti-sex-discrimination standards to internal corporate sexual harassment policies minimises the risk of subsuming an issue of sex discrimination to business management concerns alone.
The case of Julianne Ashton's suit against Bankers Trust (BT) for sexual harassment and its aftermath is a good example of how this might work. Ashton complained of (1993) . Fisse and Braithwaite demonstrate how regulatory enforcement action should be tailored to catalyse internal corporate justice systems to define who or which groupings are responsible for wrongdoing in the organisation and in what degrees and to rectify the wrong and learn ways to prevent similar wrongdoing in the future.
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sustained harassment on the Sydney Futures Exchange trading room floor where she began working when she was 20. She took her case to the NSW Equal Opportunity Tribunal since BT had no sexual harassment policy or grievance handling procedure at the time. 66 Bankers Trust decided to fight the case. Five years later in March 1996, the hearing started and BT attracted much negative publicity as its lawyers brought evidence that Ashton had not been discriminated against since filthy language and sexual banter were a "normal part of going on" in the Futures Exchange; women and men were equally subject to this environment; all young employees were put through "forms of embarrassment" as an initiation; and Ashton had implicitly accepted this conduct by using filthy language herself and not complaining sooner. 67 The negative publicity cost the bank dearly in staff morale and lost custom-and, of course, legal costs-and the bank settled the case on the courtroom steps for an undisclosed sum.
The crisis, however, prompted a commitment to a sexual harassment governance system that went far beyond compliance with the law. The bank hired one set of consultants to study the culture of the organisation and another set to conduct workshops with staff to discover what values and quality of relationships they thought should be evident in their workplace. Training on harassment commenced, combining the values developed from the ground up through the staff workshops with considerations of legal liability. The bank introduced a new sexual harassment grievance handling process that surpassed what the law required. It gave employees the option of either utilising an internal complaint mechanism or taking their complaint to an external and independent ombudsman. The ombudsman could (a) help complainants work out how to solve the problem themselves within the company; (b) write a report to company management saying what ought to be done; or (c) advise the complainants that they should seek external legal remedies. While this process was expensive, the disaster of the Ashton case forced senior management to calculate the potential costs and benefits of a sexual harassment program and to decide it was worth implementing. 68 Unfortunately, the crisis was so severe that it seems likely many employees still lacked trust and confidence in management's attempts to address the problem immediately after the new system was put in place. It would take several years of senior management commitment to weeding out sexual harassment and taking complaints of women like Ashton seriously before employees are likely to credit an employer with having changed. J Curtin, ibid at 19. In fact the evidence from Ashton's witnesses suggested that as a new 20 year old woman employee, Ashton had been targeted for harassment and lewd requests for a "head job" or "to bend over". But she had gone on performing her work well despite her situation, even after her supervisor ignored her complaint and downgraded her work performance: "BT Traders Targeted Junior Female" Age 25 January 1996 at 17. 
522
Federal Law Review
Volume 28 ____________________________________________________________________________________ The Ashton case illustrates that invoking legal sanctions to champion equality rights outside the workplace might make possible the governance of harassment within the workplace. Formal legal sanctions invoked on one occasion by one brave woman can create the conditions in which internal corporate justice will benefit many more employees on other occasions. 69 The crisis can prompt senior management to put in place internal procedures so that future complainants know they can have their grievances dealt with quickly and fairly without having to raise the stakes by going to law. Management may install an EEO unit and even, as in the Ashton case, appoint an external private ombudsman. They might conduct training and awareness programs to change the culture of the institution. Next time a problem occurs, the EEO officer may be able to use the threat of another HREOC case and the publicity that goes with it to sell a yet stronger anti-discrimination policy to senior management. This is likely to be an iterative process. One crisis of harassment is rarely enough to ensure ongoing commitment to an excellent system. Even building employees' trust to use a system that looks very good on paper is a long and difficult process. As the current splitting and sale of the Bankers Trust businesses to other banks also illustrates, gains made one moment can be overtaken by change the next.
The phases to corporate governance of sexual harassment Successful corporate governance of sexual harassment, therefore, hinges on the background threat that victims of harassment can appeal to an effective antidiscrimination regulator and/or the possibility of negative publicity and social action. With the threat of potential (formal or informal) regulatory action, corporations can be motivated to maximise the effectiveness of their self-regulatory measures; and even if voluntary internal governance systems fail to achieve justice, the regulator can function as a fallback by deciding unresolved complaints.
In short, a governance model for sexual harassment depends on breaking down the distinction between private profit-making and public rights by making public equality rights a matter of private corporate justice systems, and making private corporate governance a matter of public regulation and accountability. 70 Whenever abuse of power and injustice results from internal corporate handling of sexual harassment grievances, there should always be the possibility of invoking legal sanctions through recourse to an anti-discrimination regulator. The regulator can enunciate standards, grant rights and remedies, and reveal the unlawfulness of a discriminatory practice with the hope that the ensuing crisis will prompt fairer and more effective selfgovernance for the future (and the determination that if it does not, legal and public accountability will be swift to follow).
This approach recognises that organisations already have some internal systems and capacities for regulating their own conduct regardless of external regulatory intervention. 71 The potential for corporate governance of human rights depends on triggering mechanisms of external accountability to affect internal governance 
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processes. The aim is to use public accountability-through legal responsibility, media publicity, social movement politics and the willingness of individual victims of corporate wrongdoing to make their fight public in the law courts or the media-to create crises of corporate consciousness and force internal management to respond to human rights issues.
There are generally three phases in the managerial process of dealing with dilemmas raised by any social responsibility issue: 72 (1) The commitment to respond; (2) The acquisition of specialized skills and knowledge; (3) The institutionalisation of purpose.
Management must appropriately respond through each of these three phases to ensure effective corporate governance of the issue. Mechanisms of external accountability must apply at each of these three stages to prompt continued corporate commitment and ensure appropriate action by management. This does not mean a company should be subject to legal prosecution every time it does not do the right thing. It does mean, however, that publicity, social movement politics and legal action that do occur should guide corporate management to what is appropriate at each step of a corporation's engagement with sexual harassment. Strict liability alone will provide insufficient guidance and incentives to ensure effective corporate governance of sexual harassment. Diagram One illustrates how regulators and law (the bottom level) and EEO officers, public interest groups, the media and other private actors (the top level) should each impact on the three phases (middle level) of corporate governance responses to sexual harassment as an issue.
The commitment to respond
The first phase of an appropriate corporate governance response to sexual harassment is the commitment to respond by top management. 73 This entails the CEO becoming sufficiently interested and involved in the issue to make statements about it and to set aside resources to address it. A crisis-whether enveloping the company itself or a competitor-usually prompts corporate commitment to respond to a particular social 174 find that "the differences among firms reflect, more than any other factor, how strongly top management communicates that complying with the rules is one of the firm's core critical tasks". From his evaluation of the top 5 coal mine safety performers, John Braithwaite finds that each of the companies, in different ways, exhibited "a corporate message that top management perceives cutting corners on safety to achieve production goals as not in the interests of the corporation". of complaint with 32 per cent of the sex discrimination complaints. 75 The sheer numbers of complaints throughout the 1990s suggest that many companies were receiving many more internal complaints and that the risk of legal action was (and remains) high.
In 1997, Parker interviewed twelve officers responsible for sexual harassment and EEO policies in seven of Australia's largest financial institutions about why their companies introduced a policy and the nature of their programs. 76 Interviewees at four of the seven companies explicitly stated that the major reason for being serious about the sexual harassment policy was to resolve grievances internally (or prevent them occurring) in order to avoid complaints being made to external bodies and the company being 'tried by media' for harassment. Many explicitly mentioned the Ashton case. Interviewees at (a differently constituted) four of the seven companies described particular disasters or potential disasters their company had faced that directly prompted them to introduce the policy in the first place or to implement a renewed preventive training program. One was Bankers Trust where there had been no sexual harassment or EEO policy before the Ashton case. Another bank had also introduced a program for the first time in response to two complaints that had also taken five years to settle through HREOC. A different bank had found itself facing a large number of internal complaints of harassment and discrimination in the early 1990s; it, therefore, decided to introduce a new more proactive sexual harassment training program and grievance handling process as part of a general new training system devised in response to new industrial relations legislation. The fourth company had received a letter from the AAA saying their affirmative action plan was inadequate. This prompted management to employ an EEO officer and introduce a sexual harassment policy. 77 A fifth bank had had a sexual harassment policy since 1987, but had been the unsuccessful defendant in a major court case in 1996 which prompted major rethinking of the program.
Interviewees at the two remaining financial institutions did not mention the avoidance of disaster or a particular case as crucial to their decisions. Rather, the moving force in each company was an American CEO who was strongly committed to EEO principles. Indeed, the CEOs in these two banks-Westpac and AMP-were well known publicly and in the industry for their stance that the pursuit of EEO was important in allowing their institutions to compete by attracting high quality staff. A recent survey found that in the year since those two CEOs left, female executives in the financial services industry believed their organisations' commitment to affirmative action and diversity had stalled. Eighty-six per cent believed no CEO was leading in this area any more. 78 This change in just a few years illustrates how crucial it is that top _____________________________________________________________________________________ 75 Ibid. Now that Australian women are becoming more familiar with their rights under the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth), complaints about other matters are becoming more common.
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These institutions were chosen from information supplied by the Affirmative Action Agency as the institutions with the leading sexual harassment policies in the finance industry. See C Parker, above n 47 at 21-48 for further discussion of the methodology and findings of this research.
77
If a company's annual affirmative action report is failed, it is ineligible for federal government contracts, an issue of some importance to this company. 
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This Australian experience contains clues about the mechanisms of external accountability that prompt corporate commitment to internally respond to sexual harassment as an issue. On one level, a combination of clear legislative prohibition, media publicity and feminist action ensures good public knowledge of issues and rights surrounding sexual harassment. Why do people complain so much more frequently about sexual harassment than other aspects of gender discrimination? It seems unlikely that sexual harassment is so much more common than other forms of sex discrimination. Rather, sexual harassment is a fairly concrete concept that lends itself to sensational media coverage and also to social action campaigns, both of which can educate women about their right to an harassment-free workplace. It is also specifically prohibited under Australian law. 79 High media publicity for a particular case can help: one US study found that women were more likely to spontaneously label behaviour as sexual harassment after the Thomas-Hill hearings, which received saturation media coverage, than before. 80 In Australia, the divisive and heavily reported debate over Helen Garner's The First Stone may also have raised awareness of potential legal liability for sexual harassment and discussion of how problems might be solved. 81 On another level, the law should provide a clear statement that employers are responsible for the implementation of preventive sexual harassment policies and remedial systems-and law and regulatory practice must provide incentives for employers to do so. A distinctive feature of Australian sexual harassment law and practice is how potential vicarious liability for acts of sexual harassment under antidiscrimination legislation interacts with industrial law decisions relating to dismissal of individual perpetrators, to both encourage and authorise strong corporate policies against sexual harassment. 82 Specifically, Australian discrimination law has imposed a rudimentary duty on companies to implement a sexual harassment policy through: (1) the possibility of employers' vicarious or direct liability for sexual harassment that occurs in the workplace; (2) industrial law decisions on unfair dismissals that authorise strong policies allowing for a wide range of disciplinary actions, including dismissal of a perpetrator; and 
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Sexual Harassment and the Corporation 527 ____________________________________________________________________________________ (3) the conciliation and educational activities of the anti-discrimination "regulators" (HREOC and the state anti-discrimination boards and tribunals) in encouraging workplace sexual harassment policies. First, Australian sexual harassment law encourages companies to develop sexual harassment policies to avert the possibility of vicarious or direct corporate liability for harassment by employees. 83 Under s 106 of the Federal Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) employers (and other persons) are vicariously liable for unlawful acts of sexual harassment and other forms of sex discrimination by employees or agents done in connection with their employment or agency. Liability can only be avoided (under s 106(2)) if the employer establishes that they "took all reasonable steps to prevent the employee or agent" from doing those acts. The courts have held that this usually requires proof of an effective harassment or discrimination policy implemented in the company. Medium or large sized organisational employers will only escape liability if they can give evidence that they have taken active measures to prevent sexual harassment by issuing a policy, effectively communicating management disapproval of such practices, and training staff about their responsibilities. For example, in the case of Dippert v Luxford, 84 HREOC stated that:
While there is no legal requirement under the Act that in order to establish a defence under s 106(2) there must be a sexual harassment policy as such, the existence of such a policy would go some way toward demonstrating that the second respondent had perceived the issue as a relevant workplace problem and had taken steps towards addressing that problem.
Second, the industrial relations courts have confirmed that, under a harassment policy, employees can legitimately be dismissed for harassing other staff or customers. 85 Westpac dismissed a perpetrator of harassment who then sued them for unfair dismissal in the industrial relations court. 86 Westpac won the case, providing a landmark in industrial relations law that legitimises corporate sexual harassment disciplinary processes so long as procedural fairness is followed. This case empowered employers to take internal actions that go beyond "the palliative of conciliation". 87 Indeed, dismissal of the perpetrator was a more severe remedy than HREOC or a court could have ordered if the initial sexual harassment complaint had been taken to the public justice system. 
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Volume 28 ____________________________________________________________________________________ Third, anti-discrimination "regulators" use the introduction of a policy as a bargaining chip in the conciliation of complaints. Since conciliations are private and confidential, publicly available knowledge of how they are conducted is sparse. Devereux's study of forty HREOC conciliation files 88 suggests that HREOC uses the background threat of a hearing as leverage to ensure respondents accede to proposed conciliated settlements, especially in Sex Discrimination Act cases. In employment cases, Commission staff often encourage settlements that include not only remedies for the individuals involved but also undertakings to implement EEO or sexual harassment training programs which might engender wider cultural change within the organisation. 89 However, under the current law, the anti-discrimination agencies do not have any power to enforce a conciliated settlement that includes a requirement to introduce a sexual harassment policy nor to monitor whether it complies with standards and guidelines issued.
Acquisition of specialised skills and knowledge
The prompting of a commitment to respond is not enough. The second phase is the acquisition of specialised skills and knowledge in which the corporation acquires the knowhow and personnel to deal with sexual harassment. This often results in setting up a specialist EEO unit and employing EEO officers to introduce a sexual harassment policy. The research repeatedly shows that an internal constituency-empowered to put the relevant issue on the agenda and formulate procedures and policies for ensuring it is dealt with-make a significant difference to corporate implementation of social responsibility policies. 90 Once an internal constituency is in place within the organization, it can bring external pressures to the attention of management and renew their commitment to the issue or even prompt action on broader issues. Specialist EEO officers can act as a conduit of external accountability into the organisation. They carry information, skills and concerns from external groups (such as regulators, public interest groups, and communities of professional experts) that can significantly shape the way the sexual harassment policy is set up. 91 
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Sexual Harassment and the Corporation 529 ____________________________________________________________________________________ which requires companies to develop an equal opportunity policy for women, set objectives, monitor them and submit a report on their progress. 92 She found a positive correlation between the degree of professionalism of equal employment opportunity (EEO) officers-especially their professional networking with other EEO professionals and with the EEO agency-and procedural and substantive compliance with the requirements of the regulation. 93 Similarly, in a study of corporate compliance with United States civil rights laws, Edelman found that the professional practices of personnel officers were instrumental in spreading 'due process' protections for employees (in relation to discipline, for example) throughout the industry. Personnel officers viewed due process compliance as part of their 'professional' function. Therefore as more and more companies established personnel departments, personnel officers became a direct channel through which models of implementing employee rights could enter the organization and functioned as an internal constituency for elaborating and enforcing employee rights. 94 This suggests that regulators and feminist activists should aim to work with corporate officers responsible for sexual harassment, equipping them with the necessary skills to effectively govern harassment. Working with these officers creates a direct link between external human rights and internal corporate governance, because the EEO officers can often be encouraged to see themselves both as loyal corporate managers and as members and advocates of external networks concerned with antidiscrimination. But a specialist unit within an organization, by itself, does not necessarily lead to the success of a human rights corporate governance program; success hinges on senior management investing the compliance constituency with "autonomy and power", "clout" or organisational muscle. 95 To ensure organisational muscle, internal officers must have regulatory and community group back-up. Thus, the interaction between management commitment and external regulatory pressure can boost the effectiveness of internal officers responsible for a sexual harassment program.
Institutionalisation of purpose
The third phase is the institutionalisation of purpose, in which the policy is made an integral part of corporate objectives, daily management procedures, reward systems and corporate culture. The most sophisticated indicator of a successful compliance program is the extent to which the company has integrated social and legal Braithwaite also used the reports to measure procedural compliance with the eight steps required by the legislation and a more substantive measure of compliance via reported implementation of practices that 'accommodate' women (eg, via career break schemes, women's networks, provision of child care facilities, affirmative action awareness training) from the reports and the AWIRS data set. 
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Volume 28 ____________________________________________________________________________________ responsibilities into operating procedures, everyday decision making and performance appraisal/reward systems. 96 Where human rights are left to corporate justice systems, rights are likely to be subverted to management goals and priorities. In one study of officers within ten United States corporations with responsibility for internal grievance processes, 97 researchers found that companies introduced internal complaints handling mechanisms to avoid liability in anti-discrimination law, but that the main objective of corporate complaints handlers was to resolve complaints, restore good working relations and avoid legal intervention-not to identify and eliminate practices of discrimination. Complaints were consistently seen as examples of poor management or personality clashes and were rarely linked to public rights and standards of equal employment opportunity. They concluded that "internal forums tend to reaffirm the employer's authority over employees and autonomy from outside intervention". 98 It is not enough to motivate companies to put a formal policy in place if accountability does not follow through to the details of how the governance of harassment is accomplished within daily management. Organisational cultures and structures are so different that evaluation is difficult and perfect recipes impossible to predict. Yet regulators, courts and public interest groups must oversee the quality of implementation of sexual harassment governance programs by providing guidelines and best practice examples and by evaluating the quality of programs when complaints are made to external bodies or when grievances cannot be resolved adequately internally. Australian courts and tribunals are already showing a willingness to make decisions about the quality of effective sexual harassment policies. They certainly should not be satisfied with evidence that there was a paper policy, but should examine both the terms of any policy and whether it was effectively implemented in deciding whether reasonable precautions have been taken. In the 1997 decision of Hopper v MIM, 99 for example, the Queensland Anti-Discrimination Tribunal examined the implementation of MIM's anti-discrimination policies in some detail in order to decide whether MIM was vicariously liable for harassment and discrimination against Ms Hopper by her colleagues (underground mining engineer apprentices) and immediate supervisor. The Tribunal criticised a number of aspects of MIM's antidiscrimination policy as inadequate management of the problem. Supervisors were trained in their responsibilities to detect and prevent sexual harassment, but were not told that their responsibilities included training employees on sexual harassment. Supervisors were told that posters of semi-clad men and women had to be removed, but there was no evidence that anybody ever checked that they were removed. The Court was particularly critical of MIM for failing to monitor the high attrition rate of 
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Sexual Harassment and the Corporation 531 ____________________________________________________________________________________ female apprentices recruited to the mine or to follow up the reasons for it. Courts and tribunals in sexual harassment cases will need evidence on two issues in order to evaluate compliance systems where a breach is before them: first, they should look at whether there is a substantial and actively implemented program; second, they should look at whether it has been effectively implemented with particular emphasis on whether training has reached everybody it needs to reach and includes monitoring, and on self-evaluation to gauge whether the system is achieving its objectives.
Australian anti-discrimination regulators are making an effort to provide guidelines, best practice examples and consultancy services to companies to ensure that the sexual harassment and EEO policies they implement are of a sufficiently high standard. For example, the NSW ADB has made a point of trying to protect the rights of victims of harassment within corporate justice systems by stating that informal grievance resolution procedures normally will not be adequate and organizations must provide formal grievance procedures. A further step might be to provide some incentive for companies to introduce high quality harassment programs by providing some sort of accreditation and by taking into account the level of accreditation received when decisions are made about penalties and at what level to pursue complaints.
To make this approach effective, the anti-discrimination regulators should be given greater and more proactive powers to pursue companies that fail to prevent and deal with harassment adequately. At the moment, the actions available to a complainant and to the anti-discrimination boards are not sufficient to provide an appropriate gradation of sanctions for regulators to be "responsive" to different levels of corporate governance achievement by companies. The Federal Sex Discrimination Commissioner has stated that HREOC's Code of Practice can be taken into account by HREOC when making its determinations in public hearings. 100 It seems clear that it will also be used in conciliations. However, courts and tribunals will find it difficult to use corporate sexual harassment policies or model codes much more proactively than they already do without legislative change. There is little scope for a tribunal to hold that the adoption of a model code or development of a corporate policy will reduce damages since the Commission and the courts only have power to order compensatory damages; 101 there is no punitive or exemplary component to the damages awarded as there is, for example, under trade practices legislation, where a company's bona fide adoption of a compliance program can reduce the penalty paid. 102 Private actors can also make internal corporate governance systems accountable to external standards when companies hire consultants, auditors and ombuds officers to help them implement effective systems. Employees, union representatives and local community representatives may also have an opportunity to input their personal or social values through direct involvement in the program and consultative bodies. Indeed, the involvement of affected communities and stakeholders can also improve the quality of the program. 
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Volume 28 ____________________________________________________________________________________ employees were rarely included in consultation about EEO polices under the Affirmative Action legislation, but when they were the program was likely to be better. 103
'TESTING' THE MODEL FOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF HU-MAN RIGHTS: SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND THE CORPORATION IN JAPAN
Why Japan?
The message from Australia's experience with corporate regulation over sexual harassment is largely positivethat there is real potential for the corporate governance of human rights. The key to unlocking the potential for successful corporate governance of human rights, according to the Australian evidence, is to ensure the convergence of external and internal values at each stage of the corporation's response to the issue. Each step-whether (1) commitment to respond, (2) acquisition of specialised skills and knowledge, or (3) institutionalisation of purpose-is a critical point at which external standards of public rights must interact with internal corporate processes. The Australian case study shows how external values can impact on internal corporate workings through the agency of regulators, public interest groups, the media and, most significantly in many instances, internal employee constituencies that also advocate those values. Indeed, the Australian data we have reported emphasise a permeability between the 'internal' and 'external' under which:
(1) employees are empowered within corporate structures by the ability to strategically move from internal to external remedies; (2) courts and tribunals, anti-discrimination regulators, public interest groups and the media devote attention to the existence and quality of corporate governance of sexual harassment; and (3) an internal constituency of EEO officers use appeals to public values and business goals to change the corporation from within. But is there a flipside to this message of promise? Are there not pitfalls that underlie the potential problems that attach to the possibilities? In this section, we shift our gaze to the case of Japan to highlight some of the risks involved in entrusting corporate responsibility to issues of human rights.
The choice of Japan as a counter-balancing case study is deliberate. Japan's recent move to a system of corporate governance of sexual harassment 104 raises a perfect opportunity to test our model of corporate accountability for sexual harassment. Indeed, on one level, by applying the model we have developed in light of Australian experience to the Japanese context, we can chart-albeit tentatively-the course corporate governance of sexual harassment might initially take in Japan and predict _____________________________________________________________________________________ 103 V Braithwaite, above n 92. 104 In April 1997, amendments to the Equal Employment Opportunity Act took effect, including the new section 21 which requires companies to ensure a workplace free of sexual harassment. 
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Sexual Harassment and the Corporation 533 ____________________________________________________________________________________ some of the early challenges Japan will need to overcome. On a deeper level, by testing the model against the situation in Japan, we can gain some broader insights into the true scope of the model, especially some of the in-built limitations. In short, using Japan as case study allows us to test both the predictive as well as the explanatory capabilities of our model.
In these two ways, Japan's recent experiment with corporatising management of sexual harassment complaints offers invaluable insights. This is important to stress. The purpose of using Japan as a case study is not to stereotype Japanese law and society, but to derive lessons about the potential for entrusting corporate governments with responsibilities over human rights, even if these lessons expose shortcomings or limitations. Therefore, it is not a simple exercise in legal orientalism 105 to surmise that Japan's recent efforts-precisely because they are so recent-will reveal shortcomings to relegating regulation authority over sexual harassment to corporate governments. Since Japan's law on sexual harassment has "only just begun", 106 the nascent state of legal developments and relatively recent public awareness about sexual harassment is likely to mean that external pressures will be less influential in directing internal corporate processes.
At the same time, including Japan as a case study is not to make facile and, ultimately, meaningless comparisons with Australia. This article, we reiterate, is not an exercise in traditional comparative law. To do so would merely result in highlighting differences between two legal regimes on sexual harassment that are at different stages of development and proceeding on different trajectories. Even if it is possible to surmise that Australia is in a 'superior' state of development compared to Japan, 107 this conclusion carries no significance. Japanese law, after all, is not frozen in timeindeed, especially in the case of sexual harassment, 108 it is in a constant state of development and change. 109 Further, the conclusion assumes that there is one true path along which the law must travel to achieve effective legal regulation of sexual harassment-and that Australia's is more advanced along that route. This is not the case. Indeed, Wetherfield 110 and Yamakawa 111 correctly note that Japanese sexual harassment law
Federal Law Review
Volume 28 ____________________________________________________________________________________ has unfolded along different lines and taken a distinctive shape compared to that in the West. But more importantly, an explicit comparison of Australian and Japanese law and practice on sexual harassment fails to advance our working model of the successful corporate governance of sexual harassment. We do not propose to impoverish our legal analysis by merely polarising the distinction between East and West. 112 Our approach, by contrast, is to unite, not divide 113 -to incorporate the Japanese experience with sexual harassment as part of an effort to learn more about effective corporate governance of sexual harassment specifically and human rights generally.
So is there a key lesson from Japan on the pitfalls to assigning responsibility over sexual harassment to corporations? The lesson, we submit, is a simple one. The evidence from Japan is that the prospects for achieving corporate governance of a human rights is less likely to be promising when 'external' factorssuch as public understanding of the right and the state of the lawremain uncertain, incomplete or tentative.
Sexual harassment and corporate compliance in Japan
The latest statistics from Japan on corporate compliance with sexual harassment law reveals that Japanese corporations are still languishing in their efforts to proscribe sexual harassment in their workplaces. However, there have been some modest improvements over the last decade. In November 1989, when sexual harassment was still a relatively new topic of public debate, a survey by Asahi Television showed that 78 out of 80 companies had not given much thought to introducing policies on sexual harassment. 114 By the late 1990s, little had changed. In 1997, a survey of 2,254 companies and 6,762 employees indicate that only 5.5 per cent of companies had implemented systems to prevent sexual harassment with another 14.5 per cent planning to do so in the near future. 115 In 1999, with the new sexual harassment provisions in the Equal Employment Opportunity Act taking effect from April, a survey of 322 corporations revealed 28.1 per cent had established an internal grievance-handling unit, with a further 23.5 per cent currently preparing to do so. According to the same survey, however, 80 per cent of companies self-reported that they had at least taken some steps to respond to the issue of sexual harassment in the workplace. These steps included incorporating new rules in employees' code of conduct (55 per Sexual Harassment and the Corporation 535 ____________________________________________________________________________________ harassment (34.8 per cent), establishing awareness and training programs (27 per cent), preparing and distributing information pamphlets (24.2 per cent) and developing an internal sexual harassment policy (14.6 per cent). 116 Larger corporations are leading the way in dealing with the issue of sexual harassment: 100 per cent of companies with over 3,000 employees self-reported that they had taken action to combat sexual harassment, compared to 88.5 per cent for companies with between 1,000 and 2,999 employees and 70.7 per cent for companies with less than 1,000 employees. 117 Results from attitudinal surveys among Japanese working women are even less auspicious. In 1989, most women believed that Japanese corporations tended to quickly dismiss allegations of sexual harassment 118 and that the only course open to victims was to resign. 119 A decade later, Japanese women remain wary. An attitudinal survey of female employees in 7,200 private companies in 1999 reveal that a mere 4.8 per cent of women believed that their employers were taking concrete action to combat sexual harassment. Although 64.1 per cent of those women who had lodged a complaint of sexual harassment believed that their complaints were dealt with effectively and swiftly, a majority of women responded that their companies did not have adequate sexual harassment training programs (82.4 per cent) nor any internal grievance handling procedures (82.1 per cent). 120 These statistics match informal anecdotal evidence from academics and lawyers. At a meeting of inhouse lawyers at the Commercial Law Centre (Tokyo) on 10 April 2000, one participant reported how a company's training session on sexual harassment went awry when the male employees started laughing during a video presentation. This reaction, he noted, served to trivialise the problem of sexual harassment, and isolated the women at the training session. Masaomi Kaneko, a senior official at the Tokyo Metropolitan Labour and Economics Bureau with research expertise in sexual harassment law and policy, confirms that confusion still reigns in Japan over what constitutes sexual harassment and why it is wrong. 121 Mizuho Fukushima, a feminist lawyer who has handled numerous cases of sexual harassment, believes that this confusion underlines the lethargic response by Japanese companies to the problem of sexual harassment. In her experience, corporate Japan still underplays the seriousness of sexual harassment and is failing to protect the human rights of women workers. 122 Applying the lessons from Australia to Japan Clearly, then, a gap divides Australia and Japan on how successfully corporations in the two countries are dealing with sexual harassment. The key to explaining this gap lies in the model for the successful corporate governance of sexual harassment we
Federal Law Review
Volume 28 ____________________________________________________________________________________ developed in light of the Australian data. One of the core tenets of this model is that 'public' values about sex discrimination must infiltrate the 'private' realm of corporate governance. This, however, assumes that such 'public' values are firmly entrenched in society and, by corollary, in the legal system. In the Japanese case, this assumption does not necessarily hold.
Public consciousness about sexual harassment in Japan
For example, public understanding about sexual harassment in Japan is still in a state of flux. No doubt this is because sexual harassment is a relatively new issue to most Japanese. Although sexual harassment as a phenomenon has had a long history in Japan, it was not until the late eighties and early nineties that it emerged as a problem. 123 Some Japanese scholars estimate that Japan is about ten to fifteen years behind the United States in bringing sexual harassment into the public arena. 124 This is why Mizuho Fukushima, a Japanese attorney, describes sexual harassment in Japan as both a "new and old problem". 125 Sexual harassment was unknown to the Japanese public for so long because it was hidden under a shroud of ignorance. In fact, until 1989, the Japanese language was illequipped to even express the concept. 126 A Japanese work for 'sexual harassment' (sekushuaru harasumento, commonly abbreviated to seku hara) did not become part of commonly accepted language use until 1989. 127 Even among academic circles, sexual harassment was only introduced as an issue of comparative law in 1983 128 it was not explored as an issue in Japanese law until the late 1980s.
However, interest in the problem of sexual harassment surged in August 1989 when the first sexual harassment case was filed in the Fukuoka District Court. 129 Newspapers 130 and popular magazines 131 carried numerous articles and commissioned surveys on sexual harassment. Some surveys revealed that as many as six out of ten working women had been sexually harassed during the course of their Sexual Harassment and the Corporation 537 ____________________________________________________________________________________ working lives. 132 Books proliferated: "[I]n 1990 alone some ten separate books on sexual harassment appeared, including 'guides' for male coworkers that ranged from sensitisation and consciousness-raising strategies to more basic 'how not to' and 'how not to get caught' guidebooks." 133 There was even a prime-time made-for-television movie in which the female character encounters sexual harassment in the workplace. 134 Even so, confusion still prevails. As Kaneko writes: 135
Ten years have already elapsed since the word sekushuaru harasumento [sexual harassment], hardly a word which slips off the tongue, entered the Japanese language. Although difficult to say, the word has firmly infiltrated Japanese society. The word even became 'trendy', no doubt because it was a word of the times, and I highly doubt whether there are any Japanese unfamiliar with the word. But familiarity with the word itself and comprehension of its meaning are two entirely different matters. Even ten years after sexual harassment was first introduced to Japan, Japan is still asking itself 'what is sexual harassment?' Many still confess to not knowing.
Recent attitudinal surveys confirm that a mature understanding of sexual harassment has yet to take firm root in Japan, especially among Japanese men .136
Japanese sexual harassment law This nascent state of public awareness about sexual harassment hardly provides a firm bedrock on which to overlay a strong legal statement about sexual harassment. An overview of the legal development of Japan's sexual harassment law attests to the fact that Japan's legal response, although rapidly evolving and maturing is still lacking a firm voice. In large part, this is because the law itself is still young. Japan's sexual harassment law, after all, is barely ten years old. The filing of Japan's first sexual harassment case in the Fukuoka District Court 137 in August 1989 kick-started legal moves to develop a sexual harassment doctrine. With saturation media coverage of the case, public interest in the issue surged. This popular interest spurred feminist lawyers and labour law specialists to probe the problem of sexual harassment and analyse possible legal remedies. Law journals filled quickly with their analyses; some major legal periodicals even published special editions dedicated to the theme of sexual harassment. 138 Faced with no explicit law outlawing sexual harassment, the academics typically argued that the practice of sexual harassment, as a form of sex discrimination, offends a fundamental principle in Japanese law of sexual equality. In pursuing this argument, the academics invariably defined sexual harassment consistently with international definitions as unwarranted, unsolicited and unreciprocated attention of a sexual nature, which either is accompanied by employment threats or benefits or creates a _____________________________________________________________________________________ 132 Ibid at 17. 133 S Buckley, "A Short History of the Feminist Movement in Japan" in J Gelb and M Lief Palley (eds), Women of Japan and Korea (1994) 169 at 177. 134 Ibid. 135 M Kaneko, above n 36 at ii (translation by Leon Wolff). 136 A Okuyama, above n 10 at 15-16. 137 Y Nakashita et al, above n 129 at i. 138 Rdō Hōritsu Junpō, a leading journal on labour law issues, published a special edition on sexual harassment in 1989 (issue no 1228); in 1990, Jurisuto, a general law journal, followed by publishing its own special issue (issue no 956).
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Volume 28 ____________________________________________________________________________________ hostile working environment. Since such behaviour is patent discrimination against women and thereby contravenes the principle underlying the legal system of sexual equality, Japanese law, they concluded, carries an inherent prohibition against acts of sexual harassment. 139 The courts have picked up on the academic theories and moulded these into a judicial doctrine. Judgments have see-sawed-from decisions cautiously recognising the illegality of sexual harassment; 140 to reactionary responses, such as dismissing the complainant's suits for evidentiary reasons 141 or upholding the defendant's counterclaims in defamation; 142 and, most recently, back again to an affirmation of the unlawfulness of sexual harassment. 143 However, as a general trend, the courts have accepted the basic tenor of the scholars' arguments, recognising that acts of sexual harassment may constitute a tort under Article 709 of the Civil Code. This doctrine is beginning to take firmer shape as the early drizzle of sexual harassment cases turns into a steadier flow. By 1992, there were only two sexual harassment decisions. At the end of 1995, over 20 sexual harassment cases were pending before the courts; 144 by 1999, 88 cases had resulted in judgment or in-court compromises. 145 The legislature has since intervened in Japanese sexual harassment law by introducing amendments to the Equal Employment Opportunity Act requiring corporations to ensure a workplace free of sexual harassment. When these new provisions came into effect in April 1999, they brought to a close the first ten years of a Japanese legal response to sexual harassment.
It is tempting to conclude from this legal history that the relative shortcomings to Japan's recent experiment in relegating regulatory authority over sexual harassment to corporations may be precisely because the experiment is so new. But this is not all. Not only is Japanese sexual harassment law new, but its evolution reveals certain trademarks which suggest that it will not offer the strong framework necessary to support an informal system of corporate regulation over sexual harassment. Two themes are particularly striking. The first is Japan's very cautious and gradual legal approach to the issue of sexual harassment. 146 The second is the role of law and legal institutions in diluting the effect of an emerging law against sexual harassment.
The first themeJapan's cautious attitude to sexual harassmentis most starkly demonstrated by the initial reluctance of Japanese judges, bureaucrats and legislators to use the words 'sexual harassment'. The earliest judgments on sexual harassment, for ____________________________________________________________________________________ example, make no mention of 'sexual harassment'. 147 The first government report into the problem does not even carry the words 'sexual harassment' in its title (instead, the issue is obliquely referred to as a 'communication gap' between men and women). 148 And the Equal Employment Opportunity Act, 149 with new provisions coming into effect in 1999 regulating workplace sexual harassment, neither refers to nor defines 'sexual harassment'. 150 This earlier reticence, however, is slowly breaking down and a legal response to sexual harassment is beginning to emerge. Judges now are more forthright in their treatment of sexual harassment, and are beginning to construct a network of civil law concepts that can support a Japanese doctrine of sexual harassment. 151 In addition, the Ministry of Labor is exercising its rule-making authority under the Equal Employment Opportunity Act by progressively developing definitions and standards that it will, over time, incorporate into regulations. Even so, caution and gradualism are still evident in the way sexual harassment has been subsumed within broader discourses on law, thereby stunting its emergence as an issue of legal importance in its own right. Under Japanese civil law, for example, judges do not ask whether the facts before them amount to sexual harassment; they mostly employ the language of torts to ascertain whether the facts constitute 'unlawful acts' for the purposes of Article 709 of the Civil Code. Under the Equal Employment Opportunity Act, too, sexual harassment is not a statutory offence; it is ensconced within a corporation's wider duty to maintain responsible workplace policies and procedures.
The first theme of gradualism is closely connected to the second theme of erosion. Not only is Japanese sexual harassment law emerging in guarded, short steps; its development is being hampered-and its effect partly eroded-by counter-movements in legal doctrine and ineffectual legal machinery. An example of a doctrinal development that threatens to undermine sexual harassment law is the new direction that defamation law is heading in Japan. In sexual harassment suits, courts are now 
Volume 28 ____________________________________________________________________________________ recognising counter-claims in defamation. These counter-claims are brought by defendants who, in a cross-action, contend that the plaintiff's allegations of sexual harassment are unsubstantiated and, by communicating them to company management or in public court documents, unlawfully harm the defendant's professional and personal reputation. Thus, in one case, the court not only dismissed the plaintiff's case (on the grounds of lack of evidence), but also awarded damages against her for defaming the defendant. 152 In addition, evidence law-or, at least, its application-is also causing difficulties for female victims of sexual harassment. In some cases, despite very specific evidence of rape or sexual assault, courts have dismissed claims for damages because of a stereotypical view of how women should behave when the victim of sexual violation. 153 Apparently unfamiliar with the characteristics of the psychological reaction to physical assault known as 'Rape Trauma Syndrome', Japanese courts have questioned the reliability of testimony when the plaintiff has not cried, run away, screamed, strongly resisted physical advances or confided in family or friends immediately after an attack. 154 Legal infrastructure is also inhibiting, rather than supporting, legitimate cases of sexual harassment. Low (although rising) 155 damages awards and weak enforcement mechanisms continue to discourage Japanese women from bringing legal actions in court. 156 Further, Japanese women cannot invoke the quasi-judicial powers of the Equal Opportunity Mediation Commission since the Commission is currently not vested with jurisdiction to hear and decide sexual harassment cases. Mediation allows women to negotiate solutions with their employees without the need to resign their positions and engage in expensive, timeconsuming and risky litigation.
Future challenges for Japan
These social and legal dynamics underpinning Japan's policy response to sexual harassment, however, are not at a standstill. The gradual approach to law reform by the courts and the legislature do allow for the realistic prospect of a stronger public regime eventually emerging in Japan. According to our model, this will widen the possibility of public values enteringand influencingJapanese corporate governments.
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543 ____________________________________________________________________________________ administrative guidelines on sexual harassment prepared by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. 175 Feminists then approached the task of identifying the nature and extent of the problem of sexual harassment within Japan. Recognising that Japan's situation may not necessarily parallel America's due to differences in culture, political institutions, and social structure, Japanese feminists conducted face-to-face interviews, sponsored telephone consultation sessions or delivered surveys in order to demonstrate the pervasive extent of the problem of sexual harassment in Japan. For example, the Shokuba ni okeru Sekushuaru Harasumento o Kangaeru Nettowāku (The Network on Sexual Harassment in the Workplace) interviewed several Tokyo women over a oneand-a-half month period from late May of 1989 until late August. The Network collected about 71 second-hand accounts of sexual harassment. Seventy cases involved women; one involved a man. The findings were formally announced in December 1989 in a pamphlet entitled Shōgen Sekushuaru Harasumento (Testimony on Sexual Harassment). The pamphlet reported that 23 respondents were approached for a relationship in their workplace; another 33 were forced into a sexual relationship; and an additional 14 were raped or otherwise violently assaulted by their bosses or colleagues. Perpetrators were mostly senior company officials-including company presidents (42.6 per cent), division mangers (11.5 per cent), section chiefs (19.7 per cent), and department heads (4.9 per cent). 176 The Committee for the Equality of the Sexes, a subsection of the lawyers' group Tokyo Dai-ni Bengoshikai (Tokyo Second Bar Association), sponsored a telethon on October 7, 1989. Ten telephones were made available for the telephone telethon, and phone lines were open from 10 am to 4 pm. Calls jammed its telephone lines for [the full] six hours, and callers lodged 137 formal complaints, forty percent of which were from women who had been compelled to have sexual relations with their superiors. Six calls were from men, three of whom were victims of sexual harassment. 177 Higashiko Sogabe, a member of the Bar Association, writes that the number of calls far exceeded previously sponsored special telephone consulting sessions; the results, she adds, speaks volumes about the seriousness of the problem in Japan. 178 The women's magazine Nikkei Ūman (Nikkei Woman) conducted its own survey, also in October 1989. Targeting 301 women and 216 men in major regional centres throughout Japan, the survey was published in the March 1990 edition of the magazine. According to the results, 56 percent of female respondents replied that they had experienced some form of sexual harassment in their workplace and 70 per cent of male respondents confessed that they had witnessed acts of sexual harassment. 179 179 Ibid.
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Volume 28 ____________________________________________________________________________________ respondents were surveyed from Hokkaido to Okinawa. After five months of surveying, the Association received 6,500 responses. The results revealed that 90.5 per cent of respondents had been groped on their commute to or from work; 60 per cent had experienced verbal harassment on the basis of their appearance (for example, they were told they were "ugly"); 70 per cent had been told how useless or unimportant they were because they were female; and 60 percent had been touched against their will, shown pornographic pictures, or told lewd jokes or stories. 180 Not content to merely report on the extent of sexual harassment, feminists are also discussing why sexual harassment is against the public interest. Existing American research on sexual harassment has provided a springboard for Japanese theorising on the issue. Mizuho Fukushima, a feminist lawyer, for example, has developed a theory of a woman's right to sexual self-determination-a right, she argues, which entitles female plaintiffs of sexual harassment to bring suit against their male aggressors. 181 Yumiko Ehara, Associate Professor of Sociology and Women's Studies at Tokyo Metropolitan University, pursues a sociological analysis of the interaction of normal sexuality and sexual harassment, arguing that sex-based norms perpetuate sexual double standards and obscure sexual harassment as an example of gender inequality. 182 Women's support groups, such as the Tokyo Lawyers' Association for Equal Rights and the Committee for Women's Rights and Sexuality, offer environments for continuing discourse and consultation.
The feminist campaign against sexual harassment transcends mere research and scholarship. Feminist lawyers have also assisted female victims bring their disputes before the courts. Yukiko Tsunoda, a feminist lawyer and member of the Tokyo Second Bar Association, for example, agreed to handle a Shizuoka's woman's complaint of sexual harassment, securing a 1.1 million yen damages award for her client in the 1990 judgment of the Numazu branch of the Shizuoka District Court. Less than two years later, she joined a team of nineteen feminist lawyers to litigate (pro bono) a Fukuoka woman's sexual harassment suit. Similarly, Mizuho Fukushima, another feminist lawyer and member of the Tokyo Second Bar Association, has actively represented female clients in sexual harassment disputes. By 1993, she had negotiated settlements in another twenty cases. 183 Feminist groups have also exploited the massive media interest in sensationalist court cases to gain maximum publicity for their fight. For example, feminist lawyer Mizuho Fukushima ensures the feminist perspective on sexual harassment is represented in the media by regularly appearing on Japanese television programs on sexual harassment and attending public seminars on the issue. 184 Japanese feminists have has made important strides in placing sexual harassment under the spotlight and encouraging debate within the community. Their ongoing efforts will be critical in ensuring the success of sexual harassment as an issue of corporate governance. The test for the Japanese feminist movement will be whether or not it can retain sexual harassment on the public agenda and transform community 
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Sexual Harassment and the Corporation 545 ____________________________________________________________________________________ attitudes. If they do, our model suggests that this will raise the expectations on how corporate Japan should regulate sexual harassment and, in addition, spark greater public criticism should they fail to meet these expectations. This will keep Japanese corporations committed to not only dealing with complaints of sexual harassment arising within their four walls, but also complying with (rising) public standards in resolving them.
Converging the public and private in Japan
The immediate future of corporate governance of sexual harassment in Japan is complicated by conflicting evidence on Japan's externalthat is, social and legalresponse to sexual harassment so far. The social setting to sexual harassment in Japan is especially complex. Public awareness of sexual harassment is rising, but confusion about the meaning and parameters of sexual harassment remains widespread. Intense media coverage of sexual harassment cases should keep public attention focused on the issue. However, if Japanese journalists and reporters are simply drawn to the lurid and shocking, public understanding is unlikely to deepen. Most hope rests on the Japanese feminist movement. If they continue their diversified campaign to expose instances of sexual harassment in Japan and educate the community on why it should not be tolerated, Japan will achieve a broader consensus on anti-sex discrimination values.
Similarly, Japanese law on sexual harassment, although riddled with weaknesses, is fast growing. As more and more women continue to fight their cases in court, the judicial doctrine on sexual harassment is gaining greater strength and internal coherence. Vicarious (and direct) liability on corporations for failing to stamp out sexual harassment is now established law. Damages awards are rising; and more verdicts are being handed down in favour of the female plaintiff. The legal community is actively debating 'kinks' in the judicial doctrineincluding the gender bias inherent in how some courts have evaluated evidence and the effect of the counter-claim in defamation in deterring legitimate complaints of sexual harassmentand reforms in these areas are already under way. Nevertheless, Japan lacks a strong background regulator. The Ministry of Labour is largely limited to issuing administrative guidance and has no express power to compel recalcitrant corporations to improve their internal justice systems. The Equal Opportunity Mediation Committee is powerless to hear complaints of sexual harassment mishandled by corporate management.
Our model for the successful corporate governance of sexual harassment rests on blurring the distinctions between 'public' and 'private', 'external' and 'internal'. In short, public values about anti-sex discrimination must permeate the private domain of corporate governance; and private governance must be the subject of publicsocial and legaloversight. Expressed broadly, the challenge for Japan lies in how to blur this distinction between the 'public' and 'private' when the 'public' is itself blurred. More concretely, the challenges for Japan can be summed up in how likely external norms will converge with internal corporate processes at each of the following three stages: (a) The first stage is management's commitment to respond to the issue of sexual harassment. The evidence in Japan suggests that corporate managements are beginning to articulate a corporate response to workplace harassment, although the pickup rate has been gradual and sporadic. The fear of legal liability is an important motivating factor in this move. However, a murky understanding of
